



Wir schaffen Wissen – heute für morgen

Feedback on HLM Facilities Licensing MEGAPIE Final TRM, Bregenz, October 2014


K. Thomsen

Paul Scherrer Institut

MEGAPIE, a liquid metal target for SINQ

MEGAwatt Pilot Experiment:
Joint international initiative
to design, build, licence operate
and explore
a liquid metal LBE*) spallation
target for 1 MW beam power

*) LBE: Lead-Bismuth-Eutectic $T_m=125^\circ\text{C}$



à **Increase neutron flux for SINQ**

„If MEGAPIE only clearly demonstrates that such a facility is not licensable in Switzerland, the project is fully worth 10 Million.“

*Project President M. Salavdores
at Megapie SC Meeting December 2002*

„We are a little more ambitious than that !“

K. Thomsen in reply

SINQ – Balancing User Operation, Development Projects and Spin-off Support

- Ø **we want(ed) new challenges**
- Ø **we need(ed) new challenges**
 - to strengthen our expertise
 - to improve the level of performance
 - to remain an attractive user facility
 - to participate at the forefront of new developments and technologies
- Ø **we do not want to endanger the facilities**
 - trade-off between (partly) conflicting interests



BAG OFSP UFSP SFOPH

Swiss Federal Office of Public Health



Swiss Federal Office of Energy



Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate



National Cooperative for the Disposal
of Radioactive Waste

**The main licensing partner for
MEGAPIE certainly was**

(at least in the earlier phases)

**The Swiss Federal Office
of Public Health (SFOPH)**

(and I happily use their slides)

7th Technical Review Meeting

From concept to commissioning:


Tasks of the regulatory body
and the licensing procedure

Nicolas Stritt
Muriel Dorthé

Swiss Federal Office of Public Health
Radiation Protection Division

Licencing procedure

- Application for authorisation
- Radioprotection plans →
- Checks
- Inspection
- Authorisation issued, with list of conditions
- Follow-up inspections



MEGAPIE licencing procedure

3 essential features for the MEGAPIE Project:

- Prototype
- International
- Complex installation

Divided into subsystems / milestones

Licencing procedure

- | | |
|--|---|
| ▪ One main general authorisation (Bewilligung) | 1 |
| ▪ Clearing / release agreement (Freigabe) | 2 |
| ▪ Requirements / conditions (Auflage) | 3 |

MEGAIE licencing procedure

Authorisation (Bewilligung)

1. PSI submits a Safety Report with request for authorisation
2. SFOPH assesses the Safety report
issues statement / evaluation report
clearing agreements (Freigabe)
requirements / conditions (Auflagen)
3. Feed-back from PSI and discussions
4. Issue of authorisation for the whole installation / project

MEGAPIE licencing procedure

PSI had/have more docs. than that

Clearing agreement (Freigabe)

5. PSI submits request for agreement with relevant documentation
 - plans
 - materials
 - manufacturing processes
 - QA procedures and certification
6. Inspection of installation
7. Granting of clearing agreement – inspection report with additional conditions depending on inspection findings



MEGAIE licencing procedure

Clearing agreement (Freigabe)

Usually relates to a specific system

- Heat Removal System
- Gas System

or to a critical phase

- Inactive commissioning
- Active commissioning
- Decommissioning



Part of the CGS unit

MEGAPIE risk assessment


Risk assessment – worst case scenario

Scenario :

accident leading to release of activity (gas) into the environment
result in dose to the workers or population

Limits:

- 1 mSv
no additional emergency planning necessary
- 20 mSv
additional emergency planning necessary (involving neighbouring council authorities)



Inspections / audits

Inspection / Audits

- **Inspections / audits** are part of licencing procedure

5 over last 2 years

- **Meetings** allow regular exchange of information and discussion between PSI and SFOPH

about 15 over last 2 years, with frequency up to 1 meeting / month since beginning of 2006

Prerequisite for the BAG-license to start MEGAPIE

5 clearances of BAG

- Commissioning of HRS at MITS
- Commissioning of ancillary systems
- Commissioning of target system in SINQ
- Decommissioning, dismantle and transport of irradiated target (which depends on the HSK-clearance)
- Irradiation of the target

1 clearance of HSK

- Transport (special arrangement) & concept for disposal

Licensing - BAG constraints

Total constraints : 56

*Fulfill Status: 59%

Not started 0%	Documents available 50%	Documents at BAG 75%	Confirmed by BAG 100%
22	12	10	12
17 (incl. 4 after start of irradiation)	9	13	17 (incl. 3 with additional constraints)

*Only valid if dose rate <1mSv will be achieved

March 2006

Licensing Process with BAG

Status of fulfilment of the 56 prerequisites

Date	Not started 0%	Doc. available 50%	Doc. at BAG 75%	Confirmed by BAG 100%
19.01.2006	22	12	10	12
09.03.2006	17	9	13	17
04.05.2006	3	12	24	17
30.05.2006	0	9	28	19

- Analysis of the MITS data
- Operating regulations / manuals
- Planning of dose rate measurements

up to now we got 43 additional conditions to be fulfilled before irradiating the target

Fulfill status of all 99 conditions: 84 %


May 2006

- General global common aim, i.e., (in my memory)

„Develop and Operate a Safe LM Target for SINQ“

- Stepwise procedure with well defined Milestones & Reviews
- Clear Established Procedures
- Priority on Safety
- Documentation as required

Project phases





Megapie Quality System

Q-Policy: Having a safe and functioning liquid metal target at the 1 Megawatt region

Systems:

Liquid Metal Target

LMT★

Cover Gas System

CGS

Isolation Gas System

IGS

Heat Removal System

HRS

Water Cooling Loop

WCL

Control System

CTS

LBE Leak det.

VIMOS

SLIT QHJ30

p- Beam


Q-Management

Q-Planning

**Q-Control
Q-Assurance
Q-Improvement**

Project- and Task-Leader determine with Subtaskleader(s):


- Goals, Responsibilities concerning Q-Policy
- Implementation and quality level for the different systems
- Megapie Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
- Quality Assurance Rules (QAR)
- Norms and standards
- Project Steering Committee (PSC)
- Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)
- Project Control Group (PCG)
- Peter Ming - Megapie Quality Assurance officer
- Self-responsibility of each project member / supplier



MITS - Integral System Test (IST)

Tasks:


- Performing integral tests
- Operation & Safety Manual
- *Check Safety Systems (SFS)*




Ready
for SINQ?

Deliverables

- Mechanical Tests fulfilled
- Prel. IST results acceptable




Ready for
Irradiation?




Deliverables

- *SFS* & IST reports
- SAR update & requirements achieved
- BAG Allowance
- Operation & Safety Manual for SINQ
- NCR's closed



PSI


! PSI Directorate: go / no go !

	DECISION TABLE FOR TARGET SYSTEM - DDR2 25 / 26 FEB. 2003	
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Mi = minor impact / **Ma** = Major impact / ? Impact not known


Item	Open Issues / missing items may have Impact* = on DESIGN / COST / SCHEDULE	Impact* Mi Ma ?		
1. Pressure values (design / test)	a) <i>PRESSURIZED VOLUMES AT MEGAPIE 14/02/2003 Version 1 exists but not cross checked with calculation</i> b) <i>No Notified Body defined and restrictions/time schedule not known</i>		X	
2. Earthquake	a) No final calculations, 1. Conclusion: minimize gap between LLMC and LTE			?
3. EMPS	a) Connector system design outside of "Target EMP support flange", in the change area of "staff-flexible" and in the area of the target head flange b) Separation of work area with stainless steel (clean area) for welding and assembly c) <i>Final stress calculation</i> d) Final pump specification e) 3D Model of pump f) <i>notified body not defined</i>		X	
4. THX	a) <i>Docus: static accidental load and thermomechanical load not released</i> b) <i>Definition THX welds</i>		X	
5. LBE freezing	<div data-bbox="330 704 1663 1089"> <p>The consequence of this decision was:</p> <p><i>The Target will be splitted in LOTs for the manufacturing!</i></p> </div>	X		
6. Fill and Drain		X		
7. Cover Gas Sys.		X		
8. Insulation Gas System		X*		
9. Instrumentation			X	
10. Interfaces / Materials			X	
11. Drawings / written documents	a) 2 welds upper target enclosure b) coatings not defined (e.g. T91 window) c) lower oil leak detector (inside) d) <i>general technical specification / Test and Inspection specification not released by PSI</i> e) <i>level of dwgs for manufacturing not reached yet</i> f) Shielding update and check g) written documents not updated h) Lower target enclosure no CORR_B performed by PSI i) Seal cooling system target head		X	
12. Assembly	a) Assembly drawings b) P&ID c) <i>shielding (radiation) not checked by PSI</i>	X		
<div data-bbox="81 1132 1839 1318"> <p>Is the Target well enough defined and detailed, so ATEA can finish the manufacturing planning and cost determination?</p> <div data-bbox="1663 1260 1839 1318"> No </div> </div>				

MEGAPIE Integral Test in full 1:1 geometry was essential




- Ø EMP/EMF performance
- Ø Thermal hydraulic test with 200 kW heater
- Ø Beam window cooling tests
- Ø September – Dezember 2005
- Ø 133 hours of operation with LBE

Determining the bypass jet flow rate by finding the qualitative agreement of between CFD simulation and the warm-jet infrared thermographic method (J. Patorski).




Main EMP:23 A; Bypass EMP:23 A




CFD Simulation: Main 36 kg/s (39 kg/s total)
Bypass 3 kg/s



Full Scale Leak Test FSLT







Thank you to the IPUL-Team making the electromagnetic pump for Megapie. November 19, 2004.

P. Ming:

Besides
contracts * norms * standards



✓ Capability

✓ Brain


✓ Trust

☞ Team Work !

Transmission Monitor

- Total beam current can be measured absolutely to a few % (with calibration)
- Formerly unused signals from existing sensor hardware is employed for additional MEGAPIE current measurements (MHC4/5)
- Main improvement: new (shorter) cables
- Interlock is handled by the SINQ Schnelles AbschaltSystem SAS
- Performance compatible with 10 % threshold

Slit KHN30



- Path for improperly scattered protons is blocked, current of jaws is monitored
- Massive copper bars provide even short-term passive safety
- Interlock is handled by the SINQ Schnelles AbschaltSystem SAS (and the machine Run Permit System)
- aided by secondary sensors (e.g. vacuum)
- Confirmed sensitivity at the 0.1 % level

VIMOS

- Beam intensity distribution is measured directly in front of the SINQ target
- Glowing of mesh monitored via special optical measurement chain and software
- Two criteria proved to be most effective:
 - Intensity in Regions of Interest (ROIs)
 - Transients in intensity ratios between ROIs
- Interlock is handled by the SINQ Schnelles AbschaltSystem SAS
- Performance demonstrated during mishap October 2004

Operational and Administrative Measures

- Narrow hardware windows enforced for settings of magnets and quadrupoles between Target E and SINQ
- Accelerator operators were especially instructed
- Remote control of jaw positions in KHN30 are disabled and key-locked
- Beam setup is supervised by MEGAPIE
- A special effort has been undertaken to compile sufficient documentation
- End to End tests with the beam safety systems have been performed

One more Experts Group is Checking Safety Installations:




Figure A-3 PSA model of the VIMOS system. Ovals indicate parameters to be set by operator.

See welding of Calotte

.. we had a very good and tolerant design !!

Short list of attributes and attitudes required for and showed by the MEGAPIE Project Team and the Licensing Authority:

- **Competence**
- **Effort & Dedication**
- **Good Communication**
- **Openess & Transparency**
- **Reliability & Respect**
- **Prudence & Flexibility**
- **Patience**
- **Trust**
- **Good Will**

We were certainly not perfect in any of those

Acknowledgements to about Everyone involved in MEGAPIE

